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ABSTRACT
This white paper describes  our research on 
vulnerability assessment for complex 
transportation system facing catastrophic 
disruptions. The proposed methods  attempt 
to understand the consequences  of 
disruptions  to major freight transportation 
systems,  where the consequences are 
measured here in the limited sense of 
increased supply chain costs.  A case  study 
applying the  ideas  to  the US corn export 
supply chain is  provided.  The paper explains 
how  the dataset for the corn network  is 
constructed from  public  data sources and 
presents  the results  of an example 
assessment,  focusing on a set of dams  and 
locks on the Mississippi River System.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is one of the largest  grain 
producers and top grain  exporting  countries 
in  the world.  For  the three primary  export 
field crops – corn,  wheat and soybean  – total 
exports in  2007  measured 110 million  metric 
tons (mmt) with  a  total value of $13-17 
billion.1  On the basis of value alone, the 
revenue from  grain exports is critical to the 
economic  health  of US grain  producers and 
related industries.
Export flows for  grains rely  on  three 
freight  transport  modes – truck,  railroad and 
inland water  – while moving  through  the 
mainland US en  route to an export port. 
From  the export port, the grains are shipped 
to destination countries by  bulk ocean  vessel, 
with  the exception  of exports to Mexico and 
Canada.  In  this paper, we focus on the 
domestic long-haul  segment  of the grain 
export  transportation  chain, i.e.,  the  portion 
of transportation  conducted by  railroad and 
barge.
Currently,  the US grain  export  supply 
chain  faces large challenges due primarily  to 
enormous freight volume and relatively  tight 
transport  capacity. Moreover, the supply 
chain  is often affected by  various disruptions, 
arising  from  natural hazards, some recent 
examples of which  have been  catastrophic. 
For  example, Hurricane Katrina hit  the Gulf 
of Mexico in  2005, resulting in a major 
disruption to grain  transportation. Barge and 
rail traffic was slowed, because of serious 
damage to transportation  facilities and 
displacement of employees. 2 
Our  research  aims to identify  and 
determine how  to understand the potentially 
severe supply  chain  cost risks present in 
complex transportation systems supporting 
US food supply  chains,  with  the intent  of 
enabling significant improvement  in  food 
supply  chain  security,  preparedness and 
resiliency. Models are developed to assess the 
vulnerability  of critical  infrastructure and key 
resources (CI/KR) in  the transportation 
system,  where vulnerability  in  this case is 
measured by  the potential for  large supply 
chain  cost  increases given disruption. 
Understanding  vulnerabilities in  the system 
is important  for  the effective allocation  of 
protection investment.
TECHNICAL DETAILS: MODEL 
AND DATA COLLECTION
CONSTRUCTION OF GRAIN EXPORT 
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK
The grain  export  supply  chain  is modeled as a 
network. Each  node in  the network 
represents a Business Economic Area (BEA) 
in  the United States.3  Transport routes 
between  nodes, mainly  railroads and inland 
waterways,  are modeled as arcs. Critical 
infrastructure in the transportation  system, 
such  as locks and dams on  rivers, are 
included in  this set of arcs.  The goal  of the 
network model is to predict  how  grain  flows 
will move between  production sources and 
export  ports,  given the relative costs and 
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capacities of the underlying  transportation 
infrastructure.   In  this initial research, we 
assume that  costs can be modeled as linear  in 
total freight  flow  along arcs,  but that  arcs 
have limited capacity  for flow.  When  arc 
capacities are reduced due to a disruption, 
such  a model can  be used to predict  how 
freight  will be move post-disruption,  and 
provide a measure  of potential supply  chain 
cost  impact. The resulting  optimization 
problem  is a  Minimum  Cost  Flow  (MCF) 
problem, which  can be solved efficiently.4 
System  behavior  over  time can  be simulated 
by  using  a  time-space network,  an  expansion 
of the static network over  the time horizon. 
Figure 1  illustrates a  sample network and its 
time-space version.5 
Figure 1. A Sample Network
DATA COLLECTION
Our  vulnerability  assessment  methodology  is 
applied to the US corn  export  supply  chain. 
Figure 2  shows an overview  of the 
transportation  network for  exporting corn. 
Corn is mainly  grown  in  the “Corn  Belt,'' the 
dark green  region  in this figure.  The primary 
destinations of export flows within  the US are 
the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific-northwest 
(PNW). Corn is shipped to New  Orleans by 
barge and railroad and shipped to PNW by 
railroad.  Barge is preferred if available 
because of its lower cost.
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Figure 2. Map of Corn Export Supply Chain
All  data for  our example case study  was 
collected from  public sources, such  as the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA),  The US 
Department of Transportation  (USDOT),  and 
the US Army  Corps of Engineers (USACE). 
Technically, the data  is collected separately 
for  the two modes: inland water  and railroad. 
In  the inland water  sub-network, each node 
represents a Business Economic Area (BEA) 
along  the Mississippi River System.6  Arcs 
connect two BEA along  the rivers.  Locks and 
dams limit  the capacity  of corresponding 
arcs.  The inland water  data  was obtained 
primarily  from  the Grain  Transportation 
Report  (GTR).7  In  the railroad sub-network, 
each  BEA  is again  represented by  one node. 
Ninety-one BEA  that  have rail transportation 
activities related to corn  export are involved, 
as determined from  the Public Use Waybill 
(2007).8 The two sub-networks are connected 
b y  a r c s r e p r e s e n t i n g  i n t e r m o d a l 
transportations between  proper  nodes. 
Supply  and demand in  the network are also 
determined from the GTR.9
MODELING DISRUPTIONS
A  disruption  can be modeled as reduction of 
arc capacity  in  the network.  The general 
disruption-recovery  process,  illustrated in 
Figure 3,  can also be modeled in  time-space 
network.  In  this figure,  the affected 
component  is disrupted at  the time 
“disruption  point.”  As the magnitude of 
disruption  increases, the capacity  of the 
a f f e c t e d a r c d r o p s t o m i n i m u m . 
Subsequently,  the effect  of disruption 
diminishes and the arc capacity  recovers 
slowly  to the normal state at  the time “back-
to-normal point''.
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Figure 3. General Recovery Process and MCF Model with Disruption
F i g u r e 3  a l s o p r o v i d e s a s i m p l e 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l 
optimization  problem  given  a  disruption.  The 
notation  used is standard MCF notation. 10 
Additionally,  θ represents the maximum 
magnitude of the disruption  and  reflects the 
relative effect that disruption  exerts on arc 
(i,j).
The relationship between  total  supply 
chain  cost  and magnitude of disruption 
reflects the impact  of disruption  to the 
system.  It  is described by  a  so-called Impact 
Curve.  We prove that the impact  curve 
resulting from  our  model  is a  convex, 
piecewise linear,  non-decreasing  function  of 
disruption magnitude, illustrated in  Figure 4. 
Given the impact curves of all network 
components, their  vulnerability  can  be 
compared.  But the vulnerability  of one 
component  may  not  dominate that  of 
another,  as shown  in  the right part  of Figure 
4, where component 1  is more vulnerable to 
smaller  disruptions,  but  component  2 
becomes more vulnerable as the disruptions 
grow larger.
Figure 4. Impact Curves
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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ALGORITHM
An impact curve can be determined by  a 
series of breakpoints and slopes between  two 
breakpoints.  Based on the observation, the 
Dual Network Simplex Algorithm  is 
used to determine the impact curves for  a 
selection of arcs in  a  network.11 An outline of 
the procedure is as follows:
• Start  from  the optimal flow  x  of the 
nominal problem  with  no disrupted 
arcs;
• For each arc selected , do:
• If ,  then  the assessment  result  is ; Go 
to the next arc;
• Set the arc flow  and capacity  to zero, 
resulting  in  excess and deficit at its 
tail i and head j;
• Perform  dual pivots until excess/
deficit  is zero or  infeasibility  is 
detected;
• Record pivot history, represented by 
RESULTS OF VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT
STATIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The dams and locks on the Mississippi River 
System  play  a  critical  role in  the corn  export 
supply  cha in .  Thus , we choose s ix 
representative dams and locks for  assessment 
and number  them  from  1  to 6, hiding  their 
actual names in  this document. Since the 
static assessment  model is developed using 
annual freight  volume parameters and 
capacities,  the impact  curves represent  a 
rough estimate of the annual  impact  to total 
supply  chain  cost  due to a disruption. The 
impact  curves are shown in  the left  graph of 
Figure 5.  The right  graph  is the zoomed 
version.
In  Figure 5, since the impact curves of 
Dams No. 5  and 4  are the steepest, the two 
locks are the most  vulnerable. However, 
neither  of the two dominates the other  in 
vulnerability.  By  similar  arguments,  Dam  No. 
1  is the least vulnerable (except  Dam  No. 6). 
The vulnerability  of Dam  No. 1  is close to that 
of Dams No. 5  and 4.  For  Dams No. 2  and 3, 
the two curves intersect.  Dam  No.  3  is more 
vulnerable for  small  disruptions while Dam 
No.  2  is more vulnerable for large 
disruptions.  Due to limited economic  impact, 
Dam  No. 6  is less vulnerable than  the other 
targets, seen  in  the zoomed graph.  As we can 
see, it is a  little counter-intuitive that  the dam 
on  the downstream, which  has more volume 
going  through  it,  is not  always more 
vulnerable.
Figure 5. Static Vulnerability Assessment
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DYNAMIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The same selection  of targets is used in 
dynamic  assessment; however,  each  target 
corresponds to a  set  of transportation arcs 
originating  at  different  time periods in  the 
time-space network. The result  is illustrated 
in  Figure 6. The upper  left  graph  shows the 
impact  curves of all selected targets at  all 
time periods; the upper  right  graph  only 
shows the most  vulnerable ones; the  lower 
ones are the zoomed versions of the upper 
right graph.Besides identifying  the most 
vulnerable targets, the dynamic  assessment 
also provides the critical  time for  each  target, 
i.e., the time at which the target is most 
vulnerable. Simply  stated, Dam  No.  5  is most 
vulnerable around week twenty-seven  of the 
year,  since the harvest  peak in its vicinity  is 
around week  twenty-seven.  Dam  No.  4  is 
most  vulnerable around week seventeen. 
Dam  No. 2  is most  vulnerable around week 
forty-five.  Dam  No.  1  does not  appear  in  the 
list  of most vulnerable targets because it  has 
redundant capacity  that  can absorb small 
disruptions.  Dam  No. 3  does not appear  in 
the list,  since there is a  railroad hub nearby 
and there are good alternative routes 
available when the dam is disrupted.
Figure 6. Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment
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CONCLUSION
Based on  the assessments,  the vulnerability 
of a  target  is closely  related to three factors: 
redundancy,  alternative routes,  and time. For 
example,  Dams No. 5  and 4  are the most 
vulnerable among the six targets, because of 
high  utilization and lack of good alternative 
routes.  Dam  No. 3  is less vulnerable than 
Dam  No. 2  because the former one has more 
alternative routes.  Dam  No.  1  is less 
vulnerable because its capacity  is not  fully 
utilized and the slack  capacity  can absorb 
small disruptions.  Dam  No. 6  has a  limited 
impact  if disrupted due to its small capacity 
and good alternative routes. In addition,  the 
time when  the disruption  occurs is also an 
important  factor  for  determining  the 
vulnerability.  If the disruption occurs near 
the peak season  for transportation, the 
economic impact of the disruption is high.
Hence, the following suggestions are given 
to reduce the vulnerability  of the corn  export 
supply  chain: in  the long  run,  decision-
makers need to consider  expanding  the 
capacity  of the critical infrastructure 
components; in  the short  run,  identifying and 
establishing  good alternative (backup) routes 
for  vulnerable routes and making emergency 
plans can  improve the responsiveness of the 
system  and can  reduce the economic loss 
when disruption occurs.
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